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California Supreme Court Survey
August 1988-October 1988
The Caliornia Supreme Court Survey is a brief synopsis of recent decisions
by the supreme court. The purpose of the survey is to inform the reader of the
issues that have been addressed by the supreme court, as well as to serve as a
starting point for researching any of the topical areas. The decisions are ana-
lyzed in accordance with the importance of the court's holding and the extent
to which the court expands or changes existing law. Attorney discipline and
judicial misconduct cases have been omitted from the survey.
I. CIVIL PROCEDURE ........................................ 874
Section 877.6(c) of the Civil Procedure Code protects
a defendant who has entered into a good faith
settlement from claims of non-settling tortfeasors
for total equitable indemnity: Far West Financial Co.
v. D & S Inc .......................................... 874
II. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW ................................... 880
Ineffective assistance of counsel is proven if (1)
counsel's performance fell below an objective.
standard of reasonableness; and (2) counsel's
deficient performance prejudiced the defense: In re
Cordero ................................... ........... 880
III. CORPORATIONS ........................................... 882
Section 2011 of the Corporations Code prohibits
creditors of a dissolved corporation from pursuing
former shareholders for post-dissolution claims
under the equitable "trust fund" theory: Pacific
Scene v. Penasquitos, Inc .............................. 882
IV. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ................................... 885
A. Section 647(d) of the Penal Code which prohibits
loitering near public restrooms for the purpose of
committing lewd acts is not unconstitutionally
vague: People v. Superior Court (Caswell) ............. 885
B. Both a statute allowing a district attorney to
approve conditions of diversion programs, and a
local rule precluding misdemeanor diversion for
defendants charged with felonies are constitutional:
Davis v. M unicipal Court .............................. 887
C. Pandering under Penal Code section 266i does not
include the hiring and paying of actors to perform
sexually explicit acts in a non-obscene "adult"
motion picture: People v. Freeman ................... 889
D. Charges alleging kidnapping for purposes of rape
must be pled and proven before a three-year
enhancement of sentence may be imposed: People v.
H ernandez ............................................ 891
E. Where a defendant is convicted of multiple felonies,
section 6676(c) of the Penal Code gives a sentencing
court discretion to impose a full consecutive term
for the conviction of any sex offense enumerated in
section 6676(c) even if the defendant has been
convicted of only one of the offenses: People v.
Jones ................................................. 893
F. A jury may consider lesser offenses at any point in
its deliberation but may not return a verdict on a
lesser included offense unless the defendant is
found not guilty of the greater crime charged:
People v. Kurtzman .................................... 895
V. FEDERALISM .............................................. 898
The federal regulatory scheme governing fishing on
Indian reservations preempts state power to
prosecute tribal fishermen who violate state fishing
regulations: Mattz v. Superior Court ................. 898
VI. GOVERNMENT ............................................ 900
In determining allowable off-duty activities for
police officers, section 1126 of the Government Code
contains examples of prohibited activity but is not
an exhaustive list: Long Beach Police Association v.
City of Long Beach ................................... 900
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The Legislature may instruct a state agency to carry
out a state statute that is not in conflict with
federal law: Reese v. Kizer ........................... 902
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A. An unmarried cohabitant may not recover for
negligent infliction of emotional distress or loss of
consortium, even if the relationship was comparable
to a marriage: Eldon v. Sheldon ...................... 904
B. The Unfair Practices Act does not provide third-
party claimants a private right of action against
insurers for unfair settlement practices. For actions
pending under the now overruled Royal Globe
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decision, a final judgment determining liability is
required prior to any settlement: Moradi-Shalal v.
Fireman's Fund Insurance Companies ................. 907
C. An action by a personal injury claimant must not
be stayed against an insolvent insurance company
if the claimant elects to seek recovery wholly from
the insolvent's insurance coverage, and is able to
maintain an independent civil action: Webster v.
Superior Court ........................................ 909
I. CIVIL PROCEDURE
Section 87Z6(c) of the Civil Procedure Code protects a
defendant who has entered into a good faith settlement
from claims of non-settling tortfeasors for total equitable
indemnity: Far West Financial Co. v. D & S Inc.
I. INTRODUCTION
In Far West Financial Co. v. D. & S. Inc.,1 the supreme court up-
held the court of appeal 2 holding that under section 877.6(c) of the
Civil Procedure Code3 any defendant who has entered into a good
faith settlement will not be held liable for any claims for total equita-
ble indemnity.4 The court also rejected the defendant's assertion that
such a holding would place an undue burden on nonsettling defend-
ants seeking total equitable indemnity, since the interests of these as
well as other defendants are protected by the statutory element of
"good faith."5
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In 1972, Far West Financial Corporation6 (Far West) contracted
with D & S Company (D & S) as general contractor to build a condo-
minium project. After a rainy winter, latent defects in the construc-
tion became evident. In response to these problems, the plaintiff
filed suit against Far West, D & S and various subcontractors. After
the suit was filed, Far West cross-complained for "complete indemni-
fication from or partial contribution 7 from" D & S, since D & S was
alleged to have had total control over the project.
Far West entered into a $315,000 settlement agreement with the
plaintiff whereby the plaintiff released8 Far West from any further
liability. After the trial court found the settlement to be in good
1. 46 Cal. 3d 796, 760 P.2d 399, 251 Cal. Rptr. 202 (1988). Justice Arguelles wrote
the majority opinion with Chief Justice Lucas and Justices Mosk, Broussard and
Panelli concurring. Justice Kaufman and Justice Eagleson concurred and dissented in
separate opinions.
2. Far West Fin. Corp. v. D & S Co., 200 Cal. App. 3d 969, 234 Cal. Rptr. 771
(1987).
3. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 877.6(c) (West Supp. 1989).
4. Far West, 46 Cal. 3d at 817, 760 P.2d at 413, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 216; see 15 AM.
JUR. 2D Compromise and Release § 23 (1974 & Supp. 1988); 14 CAL. JUR. 3D Contribu-
tion and Indemnification § 41 (1974 & Supp. 1988).
5. Far West, 46 Cal. 3d at 816, 760 P.2d at 412, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 215; see 4 B.
WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Torts § 40 (8th ed. 1974); 12 CAL. JUR. 3D Com-
promise, Settlement and Release § 97 (1974 & Supp. 1988).
6. Far West Financial Corporation is a Delaware Corporation licensed to do busi-
ness in California and finances and develops condominium projects.
7. Far West, 46 Cal. 3d at 801, 760 P.2d at 402, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 205; see 14 CAL.
JUR. 3D Contribution and Indemnification §§ 1, 21 (1974 & Supp. 1988).
8. See 66 AM. JUR. 2D Release § 28 (1974 & Supp. 1988); 12 CAL. JUR. 3D Compro-
mise, Settlement and Release § 70 (1974 & Supp. 1988).
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faith, the trial court then dismissed all indemnity cross-complaints
pending against Far West. Far West, however, continued its own
cross-complaints for indemnity against the remaining defendants for
the $315,000 it had paid to the plaintiff.
A few months later, D & S also entered into a settlement agree-
ment with the plaintiff, whereby D & S agreed to pay $450,000 if the
plaintiff released it from any further liability. After a good faith de-
termination of the settlement, the trial court dismissed all cross-com-
plaints filed against D & S, including Far West's. Far West appealed
the dismissal of its cross-complaint contending that under section
877.6(c) a good faith settlement did not preclude its claim for total in-
demnity against D & S.
Noting a conflict in prior appellate decisions,9 the court of appeal
followed the decision reached by the majority of courts and held that
under section 877.6(c), a good faith settlement claim by D & S barred
Far West's claim for total equitable indemnity. The supreme court
granted review.
III. THE STATUTE
California Civil Procedure Code section 877.6(c) states that when a
tortfeasor and plaintiff enter into a settlement agreement "[a] deter-
mination by the court that the settlement was made in good faith
shall bar any other joint tortfeasor . . . from any further claims
against the settling tortfeasor... for equitable comparative contribu-
tion, or partial or comparative indemnity, based on comparative neg-
ligence or comparative fault."10
Far West contended that since section 877.6(c) did not specifically
address total indemnity claims it should not be interpreted to bar
nonsettling defendants who are only vicariously liable from seeking a
claim for total equitable indemnity from more culpable tortfeasors.11
However, D & S asserted that the terms "equitable comparative con-
tribution or partial or comparative indemnity" in section 877.6(c)
should be interpreted broadly to include all claims sought under Cali-
9. See Horton v. Superior Court, 194 Cal. App. 3d 94, 224 Cal. Rptr. 467 (1987);
IBM Corp. v. Carlson, 179 Cal. App. 3d 94, 224 Cal. Rptr. 438 (1986); Standard Pac. of
San Diego v. A.A. Baxter Corp., 176 Cal. App. 3d 577, 222 Cal. Rptr. 106 (1986) (claim
for total equitable indemnity is precluded by a good faith settlement); but see Angelus
Assoc. v. Neonex Leisure Prod., Inc., 167 Cal. App. 3d 532, 213 Cal. Rptr. 403 (1985);
Huisar v. Abex Corp., 156 Cal. App. 3d 534, 203 Cal. Rptr. 47 (1984) (claim for total
equitable indemity survives a good faith settlement).
10. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 877.6(c) (West 1988).
11. Far West, 46 Cal. 3d at 804, 760 P.2d at 403-04, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 206-07 (1988).
fornia's common law equitable indemnity doctrine.12 Because the
court decided that the statute was susceptible to either interpreta-
tion,13 the court considered the statute's legislative history and back-
ground in order to ascertain which interpretation of the statute was
the most appropriate. 14
IV. THE MAJORITY OPINION
A. Background and Legislative History
The court noted that before 1975, California's common law equita-
ble indemnity doctrine allowed one tortfeasor, in some circum-
stances, to completely shift its liability to a more responsible
tortfeasor.1 5 After Li v. Yellow Cab16 adopted the principle of com-
parative negligence, the question of how to apply the then-existing
equitable indemnity doctrine still remained.17 In response to this
concern, American Motorcycle Association v. Superior Court 18 held
that "the existing California common law equitable indemnity doc-
trine.., suffers from the same basic 'all or nothing' deficiency as the
discarded contributory negligence doctrine and falls considerably
short of fulfilling Li's goal of 'a system under which liability for dam-
age will be borne by those whose negligence caused it in direct pro-
portion to their respective fault.'"19 As a result, American
Motorcycle modified California's equitable indemnity doctrine to al-
low partial indemnity on a comparative fault basis.20
In addition, American Motorcycle dealt with the issue of how a
tortfeasor's claim for partial or comparative indemnity would be af-
fected when a defendant against whom indemnity was sought settled
with the plaintiff.21 The court said "[flew things would be better cal-
culated to frustrate [section 877's] policy, and to discourage settle-
ment of disputed tort claims, than knowledge that such a settlement
lacked finality and would lead to further litigation with one's joint
12. Id, at 804, 760 P.2d at 404, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 207.
13. Id.; see also 58 CAL. JUR. 3D Statutes § 86 (1980).
14. Far West, 46 Cal. 3d at 804, 760 P.2d at 404, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 207; see 58 CAL.
JUR. 3D Statutes § 88 (1980).
15. Far West, 46 Cal. 3d at 805, 760 P.2d at 404, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 207.
16. 13 Cal. 3d 804, 812-13, 532 P.2d 1226, 1232, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858, 864 (1975). The
supreme court held in Li that the doctrine of contributory negligence would be va-
cated and the doctrine of comparative negligence would be adopted. Under compara-
tive negligence, liability between the parties was ascertained in proportion to their
own negligence. Id,
17. Far West, 46 Cal. 3d at 805, 760 P.2d at 404, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 207.
18. 20 Cal. 3d 578, 578 P.2d 899, 146 Cal. Rptr. 182 (1978).
19. Far West, 46 Cal. 3d at 805, 760 P.2d at 404, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 208 (citing Ameri-
can Motorcycle, 20 Cal. 3d at 591, 578 P.2d at 907, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 190.)
20. Far West, 46 Cal. 3d at 805, 760 P.2d at 405, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 208 (citing Ameri-
can Motorcycle, 20 Cal. 3d at 598, 578 P.2d at 912, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 195.)
21. Id.
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tortfeasors, and perhaps further liability."22 Accordingly, the court
in the instant case held that American Motorcycle stood for the prop-
osition that a defendant who entered into a good faith settlement
with the plaintiff would be free from any partial or comparative in-
demnity claim.23
Although the language in American Motorcycle was unambiguous,
the court noted that there was some confusion regarding whether
American Motorcycle had created a new indemnity doctrine com-
pletely separate from the preexisting total equitable indemnity doc-
trine.24 The court stated that this question was answered by People
ex rel. Department of Transportation v. Superior Court 25 which held
that "American Motorcycle did not establish a new cause of action
separate and distinct from the traditional equitable indemnity action,
but simply modified the all-or-nothing aspects of the pre-American
Motorcycle doctrine to permit partial indemnification in appropriate
cases."
26
Shortly after People ex rel. Department of Transportation, the
court stated that the Legislature enacted section 877.6 of the Civil
Procedure Code27 which, in effect, codified American Motorcycle.28
The court concluded that since section 877.6 followed the holding in
American Motorcycle, and since People ex rel. Department of Trans-
portation had made it clear that American Motorcycle had not cre-
ated two separate equitable doctrines, but one comparative indemnity
doctrine, it was reasonable to interpret section 877.6(c)'s reference to
"partial or comparative indemnity" to include the entire range of eq-
uitable indemnity claims.2 9
B. Purpose
The court stated that the purpose of section 877.6(c) was to further
two separate objectives: "[1] the encouragement of settlement and [2]
the equitable allocation of costs among multiple tortfeasors." Both
22. Id at 806, 760 P.2d at 405, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 208 (citing American Motorcycle, 20
Cal. 3d at 604, 578 P.2d at 915-16, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 198-99, quoting Stambaugh v. Supe-
rior Court, 62 Cal. App. 3d 231, 236, 132 Cal. Rptr. 843, 846 (1976)).
23. Id., at 806, 760 P.2d at 405, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 208.
24. 1I at 807, 760 P.2d at 406, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 209.
25. 26 Cal. 3d 744, 756-57, 608 P.2d 673, 681, 163 Cal. Rptr. 585, 593 (1980).
26. Far West, 46 Cal. 3d at 808, 760 P.2d at 406, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 209-10 (citing Peo-
ple ex rel Dep't of Transp., 26 Cal. 3d at 756-57, 608 P.2d at 681, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 593.
27. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 877.6 (West Supp. 1989).
28. Far West, 46 Cal. 3d at 808-09, 760 P.2d at 407, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 210.
29. Id. at 809, 760 P.2d at 407-08, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 210-11.
these objectives could only be achieved by including claims for total
equitable indemnity within the meaning of section 877.6(c).30
The court recognized that the policy of encouraging settlements
would be severely undermined if a tortfeasor who had completed a
good faith settlement with the plaintiff would still be liable for total
equitable indemnity.31 The court realized, therefore, that any inter-
pretation of section 877.6(c) which excluded total equitable indemnity
"would create a substantial obstacle to settlement in cases in which a
defendant who is contemplating settlement is faced with a claim for
total indemnity."3 2
The court also disagreed with the plaintiff's argument that a total
indemnity claim must not be barred under section 877.6(c) if the eq-
uitable allocation of costs among multiple tortfeasors was to be
achieved.3 3 The court stated that this proposition did not take into
account the fact that under section 877.6(c), a trial court considers
whether the amount paid in settlement bears a reasonable relation-
ship to the tortfeasor's proportionate share of liability. The court
stated that "the nonsettling defendants' liability to the plaintiff will
be reduced by a sum that is not 'grossly disproportionate' to the set-
tling defendant's share of liability, thus providing at least some rough
measure of fair apportionment of loss between the settling and non-
settling defendants."3 4
The court said that under this good faith requirement under sec-
tion 877.6(c), derivatively liable tortfeasors, such as Far West, who
had already settled with the plaintiff but had retained their indem-
nity claim could still challenge the subsequent settlement of a more
culpable defendant. 35 If the trial court found that the settlement was
not within the range of the more culpable tortfeasor's proportionate
liability, thereby leaving the vicariously liable defendant to bear
more than its share of the loss, the good faith holding would be with-
drawn. The less culpable tortfeasor could then continue with the eq-
uitable liability claim, thereby protecting his interests.3 6
After taking the judicial background, legislative history and statu-
tory purpose of section 877.6(c) into account, the majority concluded
30. Id. at 810, 760 P.2d at 408, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 211 (citing Abbott Ford Inc. v. Su-
perior Court, 43 Cal. 3d 855, 872, 741 P.2d 124, 133, 239 Cal. Rptr. 626, 635 (1988)); see
also 15 AM. JUR. 2D Compromise and Settlement § 5 (1976 & Supp. 1988); Cal. Practi-
cum, California Code of Civil Procedure Sections 877, 8775 and 87Z.6: The Settlement
Game in the Ballpark that Tech-Bilt, 13 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 823 (1985).
31. Far West, 46 Cal. 3d at 810, 760 P.2d at 408, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 211-12 (1988); see
supra note 21.
32. Far West, 46 Cal. 3d at 811, 760 P.2d at 409, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 212.
33. Id. at 814, 760 P.2d at 411, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 214.
34. Id. at 815, 760 P.2d at 412, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 215 (quoting Abbott Ford, 43 Cal. 3d
at 874, 741 P.2d at 134, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 646).
35. Id.
36. Id.
[Vol. 16: 871, 1989] California Supreme Court Survey
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
that under subdivision (c) "a tortfeasor defendant who has entered
into a good faith settlement within the meaning of . .. [subdivision
(c)] is absolved of any further liability for all equitable indemnity
claims including claims seeking total equitable indemnity."37
V. THE SEPARATE OPINIONS
A. Justice Kaufman's Concurring and Dissenting Opinion
Justice Kaufman agreed with the majority's opinion that a good
faith settlement under section 877.6(c) precludes a claim based on
partial or comparative fault.38 Justice Kaufman, however, took issue
with the majority's view that a claim based on vicarious liability was
also barred by section 877.6(c). 39 He reasoned that since vicarious lia-
bility was different from fault-based forms of tort liability, that a
claim for indemnity based on vicarious liability was not based on
comparative fault and therefore was not within the meaning of sec-
tion 877.6(c). 40 He concluded with the observation that not only was
the majority's holding unauthorized by law, but also patently
unfair.41
B. Justice Eagleson's Concurring and Dissenting Opinion
Justice Eagleson concurred and dissented with the majority's opin-
ion for the same reasons stated by Justice Kaufman.42 He wrote a
separate opinion, however, to emphasize the basic unfairness of the
majority's holding requireing a vicariously liable defendant to pay for
some of the plaintiff's damages, while precluding him from collecting
against the tortfeasor whose actions made the vicariously liable de-
fendant liable.43
37. Far West, 46 Cal. 3d at 817, 760 P.2d at 413, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 216.
38. Id. at 817-18, 760 P.2d at 413-14, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 217 (Kaufman, J., concurring
and dissenting).
39. Id. at 817, 760 P.2d at 414, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 217 (Kaufman, J., concurring and
dissenting).
40. Id. at 818-19, 760 P.2d at 414, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 217-18 (Kaufman, .J., concurring
and dissenting).
41. Id. at 828, 760 P.2d at 421, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 224 (Kaufman, J., concurring and
dissenting).
42. Id. (Eagleson, J., concurring and dissenting).
43. Id. at 829-30, 760 P.2d at 421-22, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 225-26 (Eagleson, J., concur-
ring and dissenting).
VI. CONCLUSION
By giving a broad interpretation to section 877.6(c), the court in
Far West has placed policy over equity. Unless defendants choose to
challenge a "good faith" determination, they have reapportioned the
payment of a plaintiff's damages from a tortfeasor, who is at least
negligently and possibly intentionally liable, to a defendant whose li-
ability is based upon another person's actions. By shifting the burden
of payment under this set of facts, the court's holding, in effect, un-
justly enriches the culpable tortfeasor, whose actions brought the
parties into the lawsuit in the first place, at the expense of the vicari-
ously liable defendant.
DANIEL RHODES
II. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Ineffective assistance of counsel is proven if (1)
counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness; and (2) counsel's deficient performance
prejudiced the defense: In re Cordero.
In In re Cordero, 46 Cal. 3d 161, 756 P.2d 1370, 249 Cal. Rptr. 342
(1988), the supreme court held that in order for a writ of habeas
corpus to succeed, the petitioner must satisfy a two-prong test. First,
petitioner must demonstrate that counsel's performance fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness in light of prevailing profes-
sional norms. Second, petitioner must prove that counsel's deficient
performance prejudiced the defense. Both may be satisifed by show-
ing that counsel conducted an inadequate investigation. See generally
B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 373 (1963 & Supp.
1985); Comment, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel in Criminal Cases:
An Overview of Current Trends in Oregon and the Ninth Circuit, 14
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 443 (1978).
In re Cordero involved a petition for habeas corpus based upon in-
effective assistance of counsel. At petitioner's first degree murder
trial, the prosecution produced eleven witnesses who placed peti-
tioner at the scene of the crime and brought forward two witnesses
who testified that petitioner was the victim's killer. Petitioner's
counsel attempted to argue an intoxication defense to reduce the first
degree murder charges to involuntary manslaughter. His counsel,
however, failed to give an opening statement, introduced no evidence
supporting his intoxication defense theory, neglected to explore dif-
ferences between accounts of various eyewitnesses for the prosecu-
tion, and did not object to the prosecution's admission into evidence
of a tape-recorded statement petitioner made to the police. Peti-
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tioner claimed that these insufficiencies directly resulted in his con-
viction of first degree murder instead of a lesser charge.
The supreme court appointed a referee to make findings and con-
clusions regarding the petitioner's contentions. See CAL. CIV. PROC.
CODE § 640 (West 1981 & Supp. 1989) (appointment of referees); B.
WITKIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, Proceedings Without
Trial §§ 49-51 (3d ed. 1985 & Supp. 1988); 55 CAL. JUR. 3D Referees
§§ 7-9 (1980 & Supp. 1988). With respect to the factual investigation
of the case, the referee concluded that defense counsel's performance
was deficient based on the following facts: Counsel conducted only
three twenty-minute interviews with the petitioner prior to trial, two
of which were not conducted in privacy; counsel did not personally
interview any of the possible witnesses; and counsel failed to pursue
the leads and evidence made available to him, especially evidence
suggesting that petitioner ingested drugs and alcohol prior to the
killing.
The referee found counsel's conduct fell below an objective stan-
dard of reasonableness. The referee also concluded that a more
favorable outcome would have resulted had counsel not deprived pe-
titioner of a meritorious defense. The supreme court upheld the ref-
eree's conclusions and thus legitimized the two-prong test for
determining assistance of counsel. See 19 CAL. JUR. 3D Criminal Law
§ 2170 (1984 & Supp. 1988). See generally 19 CAL. JUR. 3D Criminal
Law § 2169 (1984 & Supp. 1988); 21A AM JUR. 2D Appeal and Error
§ 648, 778 (1981 & Supp. 1988). The supreme court stated that inade-
quate investigation is a breach of the effective assistance of counsel
standard.
By increasing a petitioner's arsenal of potential appellate claims,
the supreme court has eased the burden on convicted parties seeking
writs of habeas corpus. The court, by recognizing inadequate factual
investigation as grounds for a claim of ineffective assistance of coun-
sel, opened yet another avenue of appeal for the convicted to explore.
As it now stands, a petitioner does not have to show that trial coun-
sel's conduct more likely than not altered the outcome of the case.
One need only show that because of counsel's conduct, there exists a
probability of inadequate representation sufficient enough to under-
mine confidence in the outcome. The confusion this nebulous stan-
dard will create in the judicial system may prove unmanageable. The
various interpretations likely to evolve from this standard as well as
the backlog of cases resulting from such lack of uniformity do not
justify its adoption.
JOHN AUGUSTINE SOPUCH III
III. CORPORATIONS
Section 2011 of the Corporations Code prohibits creditors
of a dissolved corporation from pursuing former
shareholders for post-dissolution claims under the
equitable "trust fund" theory: Pacific Scene v. Penasquitos,
Inc.
In Pacific Scene, Inc. v. Penasquitos, Inc., 46 Cal. 3d 407, 758 P.2d
1182, 250 Cal. Rptr. 651 (1988), the court held that creditors of dis-
solved corporations cannot sue former shareholders for claims arising
after dissolution. Although the equitable trust fund theory has been
utilized by creditors to accomplish this result in the past, the court
maintained that equitable common law remedies are preempted
where the legislature has indicated a desire to replace such actions
with statutory equivalents. See 1A BALANTINE & STERLING, CALIFOR-
NIA CORPORATION LAWS ch. 15, § 317.04 (4th ed. 1988); Wallach, Prod-
ucts Liability: A Remedy in Search of a Defendant-The Effect of a
Sale of Assets and Subsequent Dissolution on Product Dissatisfaction
Claims, 41 Mo. L. REV. 321, 323-35 (1976); see generally 19 AM. JUR.
2D Corporations §§ 2829-2830 (1986 & Supp. 1988); 30 CAL. JUR. 3D
Equity § 5 (1987); Henn & Alexander, Effect of Corporate Dissolution
on Products Liability Claims, 56 CORNELL L. REV. 865 (1971); Anno-
tation, Availability of and Time for Bringing Action Against Former
Director, Officer, or Stockholder in Dissolved Corporation for Per-
sonal Injuries Incurred after Final Dissoluation, 20 A.L.R. 4TH 414
(1983 & Supp. 1988).
Penasquitos, Inc., (Penasquitos) was a corporation engaged in land
development activities. In 1975, Pacific Scene, Inc. (Pacific) obtained
graded lots from Penasquitos upon which Pacific constructed residen-
tial units. In 1982, several purchasers of these units discovered mate-
rial defects in their homes allegedly caused by improper preparation
of the soil and subsequently sued Pacific. Because Penasquitos was
dissolved in 1979, Pacific attempted to cross-complain against the for-
mer shareholders, asking the court to impose an equitable trust over
the distributions these shareholders received.
The equitable trust fund theory was originally approved by the
court in order to allow creditors to circumvent the common law rule
regarding corporate dissolutions. Prior to its adoption, distribution of
a dissolved corporation's assets terminated a creditor's ability to sat-
isfy outstanding claims against the corporation. Thus, creditors were
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allowed to sue former shareholders on the theory that the distribu-
tions these persons received were held in trust for deserving credi-
tors of the former corporation. See Crossman v. Vivenda Water Co.,
150 Cal. 575, 89 P. 335 (1907).
In considering corporate dissolutions, the legislature initially
granted creditors a direct remedy against shareholders. However, the
legislature subsequently amended the law to allow direct actions
against former shareholders by "the corporation, or by its receiver,
liquidator, or trustee in bankruptcy." 1933 Cal. Stat. ch. 533 (codified
as section 402 of the Civil Code in 1933, recodified as section 5012 of
the Corporations Code in 1947). The trust fund theory was therefore
held to be the only method whereby creditors could directly sue for-
mer shareholders of a dissolved corporation. See Zinn v. Bright, 9
Cal. App. 3d 188, 192-93, 87 Cal. Rptr. 736, 739-40 (1970).
After reviewing the historical rights of creditors of dissolved corpo-
rations, the court next considered how these rights were affected by
the 1977 revisions to the Corporations Code. One of these revisions
restored the right to creditors to sue former shareholders directly.
See CAL. CORP. CODE § 2009 (West 1977 & Supp. 1989). Another revi-
sion allowed suits against former shareholders "in the corporate
name." See CAL. CORP. CODE § 2011(a) (West 1977 & Supp. 1989).
Because this scheme was detailed, thorough, and included remedies
formerly available only in equity, the court reasoned that the legisla-
ture intended to preempt other common law remedies not articulated
under the statutory scheme. See 30 CAL. JUR. 3D Equity § 5 (1987).
To support its holding, the court also reviewed several cases which
were in accord. See, e.g., United States v. Oil Resources, Inc., 817 F.2d
1429 (9th Cir. 1987) (interpreting California law); Hunter v. Fort
Worth Capital Corp., 620 S.W.2d 547 (Tex. 1981).
The court then discussed the effect of a specific provision, section
2011(a) of the Corporations Code. This section permits creditors to
sue shareholders "in the corporate name.., upon any cause of action
against the corporation arising prior to its dissolution." CAL. CORP.
CODE § 2011(a) (West 1977 & Supp. 1989) (emphasis added). The
court reasoned that by using the phrase "prior to its dissolution," the
legislature intended to eliminate post-dissolution claims. This hold-
ing was compelled, the court believed, by several factors.
First, the court assumed that the legislature was aware of the equi-
table trust doctrine as a remedy for corporate creditors. The court
could find no reason why the legislature would enact section 2011(a)
unless it intended to modify the scope of the remedies previously
available. Next, the court indicated that the statute amended by sec-
tion 2011(a) contained no provision limiting actions to pre-dissolution
claims. The court reasoned that the legislature would not add lan-
guage specifically allowing pre-dissolution actions when it could have
retained the language allowing all claims, regardless of when they
arose. By using the specific language, the legislature must have in-
tended to forbid post-dissolution actions.
The court further stated that if the legislature had wished to recog-
nize post-dissolution remedies, it would have been pointless to grant
a statutory remedy to pre-dissolution claimants while leaving the
post-dissolution claimants to the more burdensome requirements of
equity. The court acknowledged the absence of legislative history,
but argued this bifurcated approach to justice was illogical and
weighed heavily against allowing post-dissolution claims.
Finally, the court considered two major but competing policies in
the area of corporate dissolutions: first, to provide finality; second, to
protect creditors' rights. The court argued, however, that by allowing
post-dissolution claims, the balance would be unfairly tilted in favor
of creditors' rights and against finality. Although section 2011 in-
cluded a caveat which asserts that it is a procedural section only, the
court maintained that this statement was ambiguous, and was there-
fore of no value in resolving the question in issue. Rather, the court
relied upon the language of the statute and the policy of finality to
support its decision. Notably, the court refused to extend its holding
to cases where a corporation dissolves and distributes its assets to
perpetrate a fraud on its creditors.
By limiting the remedies available to post-dissolution claimants,
the court has taken another step away from its previous role as an
active protector of consumer rights. A major group of creditors af-
fected by the removal of the equitable trust from a plaintiff's arsenal
are persons harmed by defective products. See Note, Continuing Cor-
porate Existence for Post-Dissolution C7aims: The Defective Products
Dilemma, 13 PAC. L.J. 1227 (1982). Given the court's holding, a cor-
poration which sells a defective product can, after dissolution, be free
from liability arising from damages the product may inflict.
Although the court specifically rejected this approach when the cor-
poration is aware of the defect, the result in remaining cases may
nonetheless appear unjust. However, the court properly interpreted
the applicable law, thereby leaving any statutory modifications in leg-
islative hands.
MARK G. KISICKI
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IV. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
A. Section 647(d) of the Penal Code which prohibits
loitering near public restrooms for the purpose of
committing lewd acts is not unconstitutionally vague:
People v. Superior Court (Caswell).
In People v. Superior Court (Caswell), 46 Cal. 3d 381, 758 P.2d 1046,
250 Cal. Rptr. 515 (1988), the court evaluated a constitutional chal-
lenge to section 647(d) of the Penal Code which makes it a misde-
meanor to loiter near public toilets "for the purpose of engaging in or
soliciting any lewd ... act." CAL. PENAL CODE § 647(d) (West 1989).
See 77 AM. JUR. 2D Vagrancy §§ 17-19 (1975 & Supp. 1988); 19 CAL.
JUR. 3D Criminal Law § 1957 (1984 & Supp. 1988). In upholding its
constitutionality, the court found the statute's language specific
enough to provide citizens with sufficient notice of the scope of the
law. The court rejected the defendant's concerns regarding inconsis-
tent, unjustified and arbitrary enforcement. The majority thus re-
versed a 1985 appellate court decision which found the same section
unconstitutional on vagueness grounds. See People v. Soto, 171 Cal.
App. 3d 115, 217 Cal. Rptr. 795 (1985).
The defendants were sixteen homosexual males accused of violat-
ing section 647(d). Relying on Soto, they asserted that the law as ap-
plied was unconstitutionally vague and violative of their due process
rights. The defendants argued that the subjective nature of the stat-
ute allowed police officers complete freedom to arrest citizens based
on insufficient probable cause. See Soto, 171 Cal. App. 3d at 1166, 217
Cal. Rptr. at 800; see generally Note, Pryor v. Municipal Court: Cali-
fornia's Narrowing Definition of Solicitation for Public Lewd Con-
duct, 32 HASTINGS L.J. 461 (1980).
The court applied a two-prong test in its analysis of the vagueness
challenge. First, it examined whether the statutory language gave
fair notice to ordinary citizens of the specific conduct prohibited by
section 647(d). Finding sufficient notice, the court emphasized the
unambiguous existence within the statute itself of the standard of in-
tent required for violation; namely, whether it was the loiterer's pur-
pose to "engag[e] in or solicit any lewd or lascivious or any unlawful
act." CAL. PENAL CODE § 647(d) (West 1988). The clear presence of
this "specific intent requirement" was critical to the courts rejection
of the vagueness challenge. See Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoff-
man Estates, 455 U.S. 489, 499 (1982). Further, the court noted that
reasonable persons would not find the statutory phrases "loiter," "in
or about any toilet open to the public," or "lewd or lascivious... act"
indefinite or misleading. Caswell, 46 Cal. 3d at 391, 758 P. 2d at 1050,
250 Cal. Rptr. at 519.
Under the second prong, the court analyzed whether section 647(d)
provided police officers with adequate criteria to effectuate nondis-
criminatory arrests. The defendants contended that section 647(d) al-
lows police to harass and arrest based solely on personal bias-that is,
the law requires police to look into the mind of the suspect and ascer-
tain mens rea before any overt criminal act takes place. The court
rejected this argument stressing both the intent requirement and the
location limitation explicit within section 647(d). Police officers may
only arrest citizens whose "conduct gives rise to probable cause to be-
lieve that ... [they are] loitering in or about a public restroom with
the proscribed illicit intent." Caswell, 46 Cal. 3d at 394, 758 P.2d at
1052, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 521 (emphasis added). This narrowness of the
statute was seen by the court as distinguishing section 647(d) from
other vagrancy statutes that have been overturned for vagueness.
See, e.g., Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (1983). Moreover, the
court emphasized that sufficient probable cause for arrest under sec-
tion 647(d) would be easily ascertainable by the police through the
use of, inter alia, informants, citizen complaints, and personal recog-
nition of certain repeat offenders.
Noting that the law may properly punish the same culpable con-
duct through different methods, the court rejected the argument in
Soto that separate criminal laws covering illegal solicitation rendered
section 647(d) superfluous. See Soto, 171 Cal. App. 3d at 1168, 217
Cal. Rptr. at 801.
Lastly, the court cited opinions from other jurisdictions rejecting
vagueness challenges to laws generally analogous to section 647(d).
See, e.g., Lambert v. City of Atlanta, 242 Ga. 645, 250 S.E.2d 456
(1978); People v. Pagnotta, 25 N.Y.2d 333, 253 N.E.2d 202, 305 N.Y.S.2d
484 (1969).
There exists a concern that vagrancy statutes are misued by law
enforcement as vehicles for cleaning public areas of those deemed so-
cially undesirable. See Comment, California Penal Code Section
647(e): A Constitutional Analysis of the Law of Vagrancy, 32 HAS-
TINGS L.J. 285 (1980); Comment, Constitutional Attacks on Vagrancy
Laws, 20 STAN. L. REV. 782 (1968). The court's holding in Caswell
does nothing to dispel this genuine concern. Police officers may now
legitimately effectuate section 647(d) arrests based on speculative
conjecture into the mind of the accused, and absent any overt crimi-
nal act. The majority opinion clearly articulated the requirement
that sexual preference alone is an insufficient basis for arrest under
section 647(d). However, the holding in this case will inevitably gen-
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erate increased harassment of homosexuals under the guise of pro-
tecting the public from crime. Without additional overt acts, section
647(d) violations should not be considered crimes, but merely fanta-
sies in the minds of those arrested. See generally Project, The Con-
senting Adult Homosexual and the Law: An Empirical Study of
Enforcement and Administration in Los Angeles County, 13 UCLA
L. REV. 643 (1966).
MARGARET LISA WILSON
B. Both a statute allowing a district attorney to approve
conditions of diversion programs, and a local rule
precluding misdemeanor diversion for defendants
charged with felonies are constitutional: Davis v.
Municipal Court.
In Davis v. Municipal Court, 46 Cal. 3d 64, 757 P.2d 11, 249 Cal.
Rptr. 300 (1988), the supreme court held section 1001.2(b) of the Pe-
nal Code which allows a local district attorney to approve the condi-
tions of local diversion programs, was constitutional. See CAL. PENAL
CODE § 1001.2(b) (West 1985). The court also found a local rule pre-
cluding misdemeanor diversion for defendants charged with felony
wobbler offenses not to be in violation of the separation of powers
doctrine or the equal protection doctrine.
The defendant was charged with prostitution, a misdemeanor, and
with grand theft-a wobbler offense which can be charged as either a
misdemeanor or felony. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 647(b) (West 1988)
(prostitution); CAL. PENAL CODE § 487(1) (West 1985) (grand theft);
CAL. PENAL CODE § 17(b) (West 1985) (misdemeanor classifications).
The district attorney charged the grand theft as a felony, but the mu-
nicipal court later reduced it to a misdemeanor. See CAL. PENAL
CODE 17(b)(5) (West 1985). The defendant sought placement in a lo-
cal misdemeanor diversion program. However, a rule in the program
barred anyone charged with a felony wobbler from eligibility for di-
version. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1001-1001.9 (West 1985 & Supp.
1989). The court of appeal held that section 1001.2(b) was unconstitu-
tional because it subjected local diversion programs to the approval of
the local district attorney which was an overreaching delegation of
legislative power to the executive branch.
Section 1001.2(b) states: "No person shall be diverted under a pro-
gram unless it has been approved by the district attorney." CAL. PE-
NAL CODE § 1001.2(b) (West 1985). The supreme court held that the
legislature had not intended subdivision (b) to force a statewide di-
version program on local courts. Rather, the legislature intended
that local officials decide wheter to implement diversion programs
and gave them the authority to construct programs reflecting local
needs.
The court determined that allowing district attorneys to veto diver-
sion programs was not an unconstitutional delegation of legislative
authority to an executive official. The court explained that the sepa-
ration of powers doctrine does not require rigid classification of the
activities of government, but allows each branch of government to
exercise all three kinds of power. See 1 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW TREATISE § 2:2 (2d ed. 1978). Although the legislature itself
could disapprove of diversion programs, this "quasi-legislative" deci-
sion could properly be given to members of the executive branch.
See generally Parker v. Riley, 18 Cal. 2d 83, 89-90, 113 P.2d 873, 877
(1941).
The court also noted that a district attorney has historically pos-
sessed the discretion to prosecute or dismiss charges against a defend-
ant. See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978). See
generally Annotation, Pretrial Diversion: Statute or Court Rule Au-
thorizing Suspension or Dismissal of Criminal Prosecution on De-
fendant's Consent to Non-Criminal Alternative, 4 A.L.R. 4TH 147, 151
(1981 & Supp. 1988). Therefore, the legislature recognized that diver-
sion programs were closely related to the district attorney's executive
authority over the prosecutorial process and determined that diver-
sion programs should not be allowed without the district attorney's
approval. See 63A AM. JUR. 2D Prosecuting Attorneys §§ 23-29 (1984
& Supp. 1988); 20 CAL. JUR. 3D Criminal Law §§ 2356-2361 (1985);
The defendant contended, in the alternative, that even if the district
attorney had the proper authority to approve or disapprove the local
diversion program, the local rule at issue was an unconstitutional vio-
lation of the equal protection clause and separation of powers doc-
trine. The defendant alleged that a rule which made a defendant's
diversion eligibility dependent on the prosecutor's decision to charge
a wobbler as either a misdemeanor or felony allowed the executive
branch to infringe on judicial power.
Although a statute giving a prosecutor the right to veto a judicial
decision after charges had been filed would be unconstitutional, the
rule at issue here gave the district attorney discretion to decide what
charges ought to be prosecuted before any charges were filed. The
court found no authority to suggest that such traditional
prosecutorial discretion was in violation of the separation of powers
doctrine. The court therefore held that the decision to charge a wob-
bler as a felony instead of a misdemeanor was clearly within the
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prosecutor's province and in no way infringed upon the exercise of
judicial function. See People v. Adams, 43 Cal. App. 3d 697, 707, 117
Cal. Rptr. 905, 911 (1974).
Finally, the court rejected defendant's claim that the local wobbler
rule violated the equal protection doctrine because it treated defend-
ants differently based upon whether the prosecutor charged them
with a felony or a misdemeanor. The court stated that if there was
enough probable cause to charge a defendant with a felony, the de-
fendant could not claim denial of equal protection. See 13 CAL. JUR.
3D Constitutional Law § 340 (1974 & Supp. 1988) (mere possibility
that similar cases will be treated differently does not amount to an
equal protection violation.)
The Davis holding does not constitute a new rule of law, but sim-
ply validates the local prosecuting attorney's authority to approve of
diversion programs. This ruling ensures that the state's numerous
misdemeanor diversion programs can continue to expedite charges
against less serious offenders in a manner that is both beneficial to
the state and the defendant.
DANIEL RHODES
C. Pandering under Penal Code section 266i does not
include the hiring and paying of actors to perform
sexually explicit acts in a non-obscene "adult" motion
picture: People v. Freeman.
In People v. Freeman, 46 Cal. 3d 419, 758 P.2d 1128, 250 Cal. Rptr.
598 (1988), the court held that section 266i of the Penal Code does not
apply to a director who hired and paid actors to perform sexually ex-
plicit acts in a non-obscene "adult" film, but did not pay the actors
"for the purpose of sexual arousal or gratification." Freeman, 46 Cal.
3d at 424-25, 758 P.2d at 1133, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 603. The court con-
cluded that to make section 266i applicable to the defendant direc-
tor's conduct "would unlawfully impinge upon protected First
Amendment rights." Id. at 424, 758 P.2d at 1133, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 603;
see U.S. CONST. amend. I; see generally 7 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF
CALIFORNIA LAW, Constitutional Law §§ 231-232, 237, 316, 326 (1988);
16 AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 501 (1984); 13 CAL. JUR. 3D Con-
stitutional Law §§ 242-243 (1984 & Supp. 1988); cf. CAL. CONST. art. I,
§ 2(a).
The defendant director was convicted of pandering, that is.
"procur[ing] another person for the purposes of prostitution." CAL.
PENAL CODE § 266i (a) (West 1988). See generally 63A AM. JUR. 2D
Prostitution §§ 15-30 (1984); 73 C.J.S. Prostitution and Related Of-
fenses 8-20 (1983); 17 CAL. JUR. 3D Criminal Law §§ 875-879 (1984 &
Supp. 1988). He had hired the actors to perform sexually explicit acts
in a film he was producing and directing. The filming was not open
to the public. The defendant was not charged with any obscenity law
violations. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 311 (West Supp. 1989).
The court noted that because the film had not been found to be ob-
scene, "the prosecution of defendant under the pandering statute
must be viewed as a somewhat transparent attempt at an 'end run'
around the First Amendment and the state obscenity laws." Free-
man, 46 Cal. 3d at 423, 758 P.2d at 1133, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 603. See
generally Comment, New Prosecutorial Techniques and Continued
Judicial Vagueness: An Argument for Abandoning Obscenity as a
Legal Concept, 21 UCLA L. REV. 181, 213-40 (1973) The court ad-
dressed the People's argument that since the actors had performed
sexual acts for money, they were prostitutes, thereby making the di-
rector who paid and hired them a panderer under section 266i. The
court rejected this argument by pointing out that "prostitution"
under section 647 of the Penal Code requires a "lewd act," which in
turn requires sexual contact between the prostitute and the paying
customer "for the purpose of sexual arousal or gratification of the
customer or the prostitute." Freeman, 46 Cal. 3d at 424, 758 P.2d at
1134, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 604 (quoting People v. Hill, 103 Cal. App. 3d
525, 534-35, 163 Cal. Rptr. 99, 109 (1980) (emphasis in original)). The
court held the defendant neither elicited the requisite conduct nor
emitted the requisite mens rea under section 266i.
Although the defendant's conduct fell outside the scope of section
266i, the court nevertheless addressed the statute's possible first
amendment infringement. The court noted its duty to consider the
legislative intent regarding the statute and, in turn, the presumption
that the legislature would not intend unconstitutional results. See 58
CAL. JUR. 3D Statutes § 90 (1984). Further, the court stressed that
non-obscene motion pictures, including defendant's, fall within the
ambit of first amendment protection. See, e.g., Barrows v. Municipal
Court, 1 Cal. 3d 821, 824, 464 P.2d 483, 486, 83 Cal. Rptr. 819, 822
(1970); see generally 7 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW,
Constitutional Law § 237 (1988); 13 CAL. JUR. 3D Constitutional Law
§ 242-43 (1984 & Supp. 1988). The court concluded the legislature did
not intend section 266i to apply to the payment and hiring of actors
and actresses in nonobscene motion pictures.
The court disapproved of appellate decisions which held that per-
formance of sexual acts by paid actors or models by itself constituted
prostitution for the purposes of section 266i. See, e.g., People v.
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Fixler, 56 Cal. App. 3d 321, 128 Cal. Rptr. 363 (1976). Nevertheless,
the court maintained that it would be unlawful to commit "crimes in-
dependent of and totally apart from any payment for the right to
photograph the conduct." Freeman, 46 Cal. 3d at 429, 758 P.2d at
1138, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 608. Examples of crimes included murder,
rape, robbery, and aiding and abetting intercourse with a minor.
The defendant director's conduct was not a crime "independent of
and totally apart from" the payment to the actors and actresses.
In a clear victory for those producing sexually explicit films, the
court concluded that the defendant director's "speech" was protected
by the first amendment. In the future, prosecutors will not be able to
attempt similar "end runs" around the first amendment and the ob-
scenity laws. Unfortunately, prosecutors must now rely solely on
the unpredictable and confusing obscenity laws in order to prevent
productions exhibiting sexually explicit conduct. Those who will
benefit most from the confusion and unpredictability of the obscenity
laws will be those involved in the production of such works.
MICHAEL J. GAINER
D. Charges alleging kidnapping for purposes of rape
must be pled and proven before a three-year
enhancement of sentence may be imposed: People v.
Hernandez.
In People v. Hernandez, 46 Cal. 3d 194, 757 P. 2d 1013, 249 Cal.
Rptr. 850 (1988), the supreme court held that a charge alleging kid-
napping for purposes of rape must be pled and proven before an en-
hancement may be imposed under section 667.8 of the Penal Code.
Section 667.8(a) states that "any person convicted of a felony viola-
tion of section 261, 264.1, 288a or 289 who, for the purposes of com-
mitting that sexual offense, kidnapped the victim in violation of
Section 207, shall be punished by an additional term of three years."
CAL. PENAL CODE § 667.8(a) (West 1988) (emphasis added).
Although not expressly stated in the statute, a pleading and proof re-
quirement was implied from the statutory language and held to be
necessary to the defendant's due process rights.
The defendant was convicted of rape, assault and kidnapping. Evi-
dence indicated that the defendant was intoxicated at the time of the
incident. At trial, section 667.8(a) was neither pled nor proven by the
prosecutor. It was not until the probation report that the three-year
enhancement of section 667.8(a) was first introduced. At issue on ap-
peal was whether the three-year enhancement may be imposed
under section 667.8(a) when a violation of that statute was neither
pled nor proven at trial. The court of appeal found no express re-
quirement that section 667.8 be pled and proven and therefore held
that the additional term may be imposed.
To resolve the interpretation of section 667.8(a), the court ex-
amined the statutory languge. Section 667.8 states that the kidnap-
ping must be "for the purpose of" committing one of the specified
sex offenses. CAL. PENAL CODE § 667.8(a) (West 1988). The court
noted that a statute requiring the defendant to act "for the purpose
of" achieving some futher end actually requires proof of a specific in-
tent. See People v. Hood, 1 Cal. 3d 444, 457, 462 P.2d 370, 378, 82 Cal.
Rptr. 618, 626 (1969). Thus, the court held that section 667.8 must be
pled, and that the defendant's specific intent be proven before the en-
hancement may be imposed.
The court rejected the prosecutor's argument that section 667.8 is a
sentencing fact. See CAL. R. CT. 421(b)(3) (West 1988). Since proof of
specific intent is required at trial, the court held that section 667.8 is
not a mere sentencing consideration for the judge.
The defendant argued that since section 667.8 is a substantive of-
fense, not an enhancement, his conviction under that statute was im-
proper as it was neither pled nor proven. See People v. Lohbauer, 29
Cal. 3d 364, 368, 627 P.2d 183, 184, 173 Cal. Rptr. 453, 454 (1981). The
court rejected this argument. Had a violation of the statute been a
substantive offense, one of the three felony punishments would have
been specified: a year-and-a-day sentence, life imprisonment, or
death. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170(a)(2) (West 1988); CAL. R. CT.
405(b) (1988). Since "an additional term of three years" is specified
in the statute, but the three felony punishments are not, the court
held that section 667.8 is an enhancement, not a substantive crime.
Finally, the court pointed out that requiring that section 667.8 be
pled and proven before imposing the enhancement will eliminate due
process problems. Due process requires that the defendant be ad-
vised of the charges against him so that an adequate defense may be
prepared. See People v. Thomas, 43 Cal. 3d 818, 823, 740 P.2d 419, 421,
239 Cal. Rptr. 307, 309 (1987); Lohbauer, 29 Cal. 3d at 369-70, 627 P.2d
at 185, 173 Cal. Rptr. at 455. If the defendant had been advised, of the
section 667.8(a) charge before trial, he could have introduced evi-
dence of voluntary intoxication as a defense to the specific intent re-
quirement under section 667.8. Since he was not advised of the
charge he was effectively denied an opportunity to prepare a defense.
The denial of this opportunity was violative of the defendant's right
to due process. The court held that failure to plead and prove section
667.8(a) before imposing the enhancement was reversible error.
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Pleading and proof of section 667.8(a) is therefore required before
its three-year sentence enhancement may be imposed. Although not
expressly stated, such a requirement is implied from the statutory
language and the right to due process. In its analysis, the court held
that section 667.8 is an enhancement, not a substantive offense or a
mere sentencing fact. Finally, the court noted that requiring the stat-
ute to be pled and proven will give defendants an opportunity to pre-
pare an adequate defense, consistent with their right to due process.
BRYAN HANCE
E. Where a defendant is convicted of multiple felonies,
section 66Z6(c) of the Penal Code gives a sentencing
court discretion to impose a full consecutive term for
the conviction of any sex offense enumerated in
section 66Z6(c) even if the defendant has been
convicted of only one of the offenses: People v. Jones.
In People v. Jones, 46 Cal. 3d 585, 758 P.2d 1165, 250 Cal. Rptr. 635
(1988), the supreme court held that where a defendant has been con-
victed of multiple felonies, section 667.6(c) of the Penal Code gives
courts the authority to impose a full consecutive term for the convic-
tion of any sex offense enumerated in subdivision (c), even if the de-
fendant has been convicted of only one of the enumerated sex
offenses (ESO). See CAL. PENAL CODE § 667.6(c) (West 1988). This
holding overturned California appellate court decisions, which held
that section 667.6(c)'s consecutive sentencing provision only applied
where a defendant had been convicted of more than one ESO. See,
e.g., People v. Waite, 146 Cal. App. 3d 585, 192 Cal. Rptr. 245 (1983).
The court also held that the 1982 amendment to section 707.2 of
the Welfare and Institutions Code broadened the sentencing court's
discretion to impose a state prison term upon defendants who were
minors at the time of the offense, notwithstanding a positive Youth
Authority (YA) determination that the defendants were amenable to
YA commitment. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 707.2 (West 1984 &
Supp. 1989).
In Jones, a juvenile defendant raped a woman during the burglary
of her house. The court sentenced him to two consecutive sentences,
one for the robbery and another, pursuant to section 667.6(c) of the
Penal Code for the rape. The court decided that Jones must serve his
seventeen-year sentence in a state prison even though the YA had
determined that he was amenable to YA commitment. The defend-
ant contended that since he had been convicted of a single sex convic-
tion, the court had erred in giving him a consecutive sentence
pursuant to section 667.6(c), which in his opinion only applied to the
conviction for multiple ESO's.
Section 667.6(c) gives the court discretion to impose multiple
sentences consecutively or concurrently. 22 CAL. JUR. 3D Criminal
Law § 3414 (1985 & Supp. 1988). Section 667.6(c) states:
In lieu of the term provided in section 1170.1 [sentencing terms for two or
more felony convictions], a full, separate, and consecutive term may be im-
posed for each violation of subdivision (2) or (3) of Section 261 [rape], Section
264.1 [rape while acting in concert with another person] .... Section 289 [pene-
tration of genital or anal opening by foreign object], or of committing sodomy
or oral copulation in violation of Section 286 or 288a by force, violence, duress,
menace, or . . . whether or not the crimes were committed during a single
transaction.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 667.6(c) (West 1988 & Supp. 1989). The defend-
ant contended that section 667.6(c)'s reference to "the crimes," as
well as a comparison with the terms used in section 667.6(d) makes
subdivision (c) inapplicable when only one of the multiple crimes is
an ESO. See CAL. PENAL CODE 667.6(d) (West 1988 & Supp. 1989).
Regarding the word "crimes" in subdivision (c), the court stated
that in accordance with section 7 of the Penal Code, "the singular
number includes the plural, and the plural the singular" and that
under this rule of construction, the plural word "crimes" must be in-
terpreted to be consistent with the singular phrase "each violation"
that appears earlier in the provision. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 7 (West
1988); see also People v. Jamison, 150 Cal. App. 3d 1167, 1175, 198 Cal.
Rptr. 407, 412 (1984). Thus the legislature did not intend to restrict
the operation of 667.6(c) to cases in which a defendant has been con-
victed of two or more ESO's. See 73 AM. JUR. 2D Statutes § 300 (1974
& Supp. 1988).
The defendant argued that the use of the plural word "crimes" in
both subdivisions (c) and (d) implied that subdivision (c) was limited
to multiple ESOs. Subdivision (d) immediately follows subdivision
(c) and states "[a] full, separate and consecutive term shall be served
for each violation of [those crimes listed in sub. (c)] .... if the crimes
involve separate victims or involve the same victim on separate occa-
sions." CAL. PENAL CODE § 667.6(d) (West 1988 & Supp. 1989) (em-
phasis added). The defendant argued that since subdivision (d)
applied only to multiple ESOs and the word "crimes" appears in both
subdivisions, the word "crimes" must also apply to multiple ESOs in
subdivision (c).
The court held, however, that such an interpretation was incorrect;
no rule of law required the same meaning be attached to a word
throughout a statute-especially when the same word may have a dif-
ferent meaning to effectuate the intention of the act. To buttress its
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conclusion, the court stated that subdivision (c) was discriminatory
where an ESO was involved with other crimes, whereas subdivision
(d) made it mandatory upon the courts to impose consecutive
sentences where two or more ESOs were involved. The court rea-
soned therefore that the difference between legislatively granted dis-
cretionary and mandatory sentencing suggested that the word
"crimes" in subdivisions (c) and (d) had different meanings.
The defendant also argued that the court abused its discretion in
sentencing him to state prison. He argued that since he was a minor
at the time of the crime and had been evaluated to be amenable to
YA training and treatment; therefore he contended that the court
abused its discretion in failing to give the YA recommendation
proper weight when it sentenced him to state prison. See 2 B.
WITKIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMES, Punishment for Crimes § 925 (Supp.
1985). To fortify his argument, the defendant cited People v. Carl B.,
24 Cal. 3d 212, 219, 594 P.2d 14, 18, 155 Cal. Rptr. 189, 193 (1979),
which determined that a trial court had abused its discretion under
section 707.2 of the Welfare and Institutions Code in not giving
proper weight to a YA recommendation during sentencing. The
court found Carl B. was not controlling since 707.2 had been amended
in 1982 to broaden the court's discretion in committing defendants to
a state prison despite a positive YA commitment recommendation.
See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 707.2 (West 1984 & Supp. 1989).
The court found that the need to protect society, the seriousness of
the offenses, and the interests of justice outweighed the defendant's
ammenability to YA commitment. The court's arguments that sec-
tion 667.6(c) is unambiguous cannot hide the fact there is a sharp di-
vision in appellate decisions. Such evidence provides adequate proof
that section 667.6(c) is at least susceptible to more than one interpre-
tation. Therefore, the construction most favorable to the defendant
should be adopted until the legislature clarifies the statute.
DANIEL RHODES
F. A jury may consider lesser offenses at any point in its
deliberation but may not return a verdict on a lesser
included offense unless the defendant is found not
guilty of the greater crime charged: People v.
Kurtzman.
In People v. Kurtzman, 46 Cal. 3d 322, 758 P.2d 572, 250 Cal. Rptr.
244 (1988), the supreme court clarified the holding of Stone v. Supe-
rior Court, 31 Cal. 3d 503, 646 P.2d 809, 183 Cal. Rptr. 647 (1982),
which established guidelines for instructing juries on greater and
lesser included offenses. The court concluded that Stone simply re-
stricts a jury from returning a verdict on a lesser included offense
before acquitting a defendant on the greater crime charged. The
court determined that Stone does not preclude a jury from consider-
ing lesser offenses before it has returned a verdict on the greater of-
fense. See B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, Trial § 480
(1963 & Supp. 1985); 21 CAL. JUR. 3D Criminal Law § 3067 (1985 &
Supp. 1988).
The trial court instructed the jury that if it were not convinced be-
yond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was guilty of first degree
murder it could convict him of a lesser included offense. See CALI-
FORNIA JURY INSTRUCTIONS Criminal (CALJIC) No. 17.10 (5th ed.
1988); see also B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL PROCEDURE §§ 478,
480 (1963 & Supp. 1985). After three days of deliberation, the jury
failed to reach agreement on the first degree murder charge, but
agreed on manslaughter. The judge then told them to unanimously
agree on the first degree murder charge. See CALJIC No. 8.75 (Supp.
1987) (jury instructions which help jurors delineate sequence of de-
liberations in homicide cases). They returned a verdict of not guilty
of first degree mudrer. See generally 75 AM. JUR. 2D Trial §§ 573-74
(1974 & Supp. 1988); 21 CAL. JUR. 3D Criminal Law § 3053 (1985).
The jury was then instructed to deliberate on the issue of second
degree murder. During their considerations, the jury asked the judge
whether they could find the defendant guilty of manslaughter with-
out first unanimously finding him not guilty of second degree mur-
der. The judge answered that under Stone, the jury had to
unanimously agree on the second degree murder charge before con-
sidering the lesser offense of manslaughter. The jury found the de-
fendant guilty of second degree murder. The defendant appealed
contending that the instructions interfered with the jury's delibera-
tions and coerced it into entering the guilty verdict on the second de-
gree murder charge. See 59 CAL. JUR. 3D Trial § 102 (1980 & Supp.
1988).
In Stone, the court held that a "trial court is constitutionally obli-
gated to afford the jury an opportunity to render a partial verdict of
aquittal on a greater offense when the jury is deadlocked only on an
uncharged lesser included offense." Stone v. Superior Court, 31 Cal.
3d 503, 519, 646 P.2d 809, 820, 183 Cal. Rptr. 647, 658 (1982). The court
suggested that a number of judicially declared rules of criminal pro-
cedure could be used to help a jury reach a verdict on greater and
lesser included offenses. The court reiterated, however, that regard-
less which procedure was used, "the jury must be cautioned ... that
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it should first decide whether the 'defendant is guilty of the greater
offense before considering the lesser offense, or if it is unable to
agree on that offense, it should not return a verdict on the lesser of-
fense." Id.
The court noted that the instructions given in the instant case were
indicative of the overly-broad interpretation given to Stone. The
court stated that while Stone had led to some confusion in the past,
its overall import "is simply that the jury must acquit of the greater
offense before returning a verdict on the lesser included offense, and
no further control of the sequence of jury deliberations was in-
tended." Kurtzman, 46 Cal. 3d at 330-31, 759 P.2d at 577, 250 Cal.
Rptr. at 249.
To support its conclusion, the court stated that its interpretation of
Stone was consistent with the fact that Stone also allowed a trial
court the alternative of not giving the jury any instructions unless it
appeared that a deadlock was developing. Therefore, juries which
were given no sequence of deliberation could structure their consid-
erations in any order they chose. Consequently, the court noted, it
would be arbitrary if one jury had to follow a strict pattern of consid-
ering offenses and another jury did not simply because a judge antici-
pated a deadlock.
The court concluded with interpreting Stone as representing an ap-
propriate balancing of interests: protected the defendant's interest in
not having unduly restricted jury deliberations and also to protect
the state's interest in requiring the jury to return a verdict on the
greater offense first. Finally, the court bolstered its argument by
noting that its interpretations of Stone had also been adopted by
other courts of appeal in the state. See People v. Campbell, 193 Cal.
App. 3d 1653, 1573, 239 Cal. Rptr. 214, 226 (1987); People v. Gibson,
195 Cal. App. 3d 841, 848, 241 Cal. Rptr. 126, 130 (1987). Although
the trial court misapplied Stone, the court found the error harmless
since the jury had in fact discussed the lesser offenses while deliber-
ating on the second degree murder charge. See B. WITKIN, CALIFOR-
NIA CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 492 (1963 & Supp. 1985). The court
therefore affirmed the defendant's conviction.
As the court noted, Kurtzman was an "inevitable successor" to
Stone. Kurtzman, 46 Cal. 3d at 328, 758 P.2d at 756, 250 Cal. Rptr. at
248. While Stone addressed the situation when a jury was unanimous
on the greater offense but undecided on the lesser, there was much
confusion as to the proper procedure when there was jury disagree-
ment on the greater offense. Kurtzman clarified the appropriate pro-
cedure to be followed in these situations while still allowing the jury
to have as much freedom as possible during the deliberation of a
homicide verdict.
DANIEL RHODES
V. FEDERALISM
The federal regulatory scheme governing fishing on
Indian reservations preempts state power to prosecute
tribal fishermen who violate state fishing regulations:
Mattz v. Superior Court.
In Mattz v. Superior Court, 46 Cal. 3d 355, 758 P.2d 606, 250 Cal.
Rptr. 278 (1988), the supreme court issued a peremptory writ to pro-
hibit the state from prosecuting tribal fishermen under state law. In
doing so, the court relied upon its decision in People v. McCovey, 36
Cal. 3d 517, 685 P.2d 687, 205 Cal. Rptr. 643 (1984). In McCovey, the
court held that the comprehensive federal regulation of Indian fish-
ing rights on the Hoopa Valley Indian Reservation (the Reservation)
preempts the state from criminally prosecuting Yurok Indians for al-
leged violations of commercial fishing statutes. See CAL. FISH &
GAME CODE §§ 8434, 8685.6 (West 1984 & Supp. 1989); see also 34 CAL.
JUR. 3D Fish & Game § 40 (1977 & Supp. 1988).
In the present case, defendants, all Yurok Indians who lived on the
Reservation, were charged with violating and conspiring to violate
certain provisions of the Fish & Game Code. See CAL. FISH & GAME
CODE §§ 8434, 8685.6 (West 1984 & Supp. 1989); CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 182 (West 1977 & Supp. 1989). These provisions prohibit the sale of
fish taken from the Klamath River, and the sale or possession for
sale of any salmon, steelhead, or striped bass, taken from California
waters with the use of a gill net. See WEBSTER'S INTERNATIONAL DIC-
TIONARY 957 (3d ed. 1971) (defining gill net)).
After an extensive description of the Reservation and its growth,
the court concluded that the defendants, at the time of the alleged
violation, were fishing on the Reservation. The court then stated the
purpose of the federal regulatory scheme relating to the Reservation:
"to protect the fishery resources and to establish procedures for the
exercise of the fishing rights of Indians of the Reservation .... The
regulations are intended to promote reasonably equal access to the
fishery resources of the Reservation by all Indians of the Reservation
and to assure adequate spawning escapement." 25 C.F.R. § 250.1(a)
(1988). After noting the detail and comprehensiveness of the federal
scheme, the court concluded that exercise of state criminal jurisdic-
tion in this area would disrupt the federal scheme. The court dis-
missed the concept of concurrent state court jurisdiction dubbing it
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an incompatible system. See CAL. JUR. 3D Indians §§ 6-8 (1977 &
Supp. 1988).
The court then addressed the appellate court's mistake in distin-
guishing McCovey with the instant case. The court of appeal's rea-
soned that McCovey was not controlling because the salmon
population in the Klamath River had declined since McCovey to such
an extent as to be classified as an endangered species, thus legitimiz-
ing concurrent state jurisdiction over the threatened resource. De-
spite the declining salmon population, the supreme court determined
that McCovey controlled for two reasons. First, even if the salmon
population had dwindled since McCovey to such an extent to justify
concurrent state jurisdiction, such rationale could not sustain crimi-
nal charges based on conduct which occurred three years prior to Mc-
Covey. Second, the court decided that a mere decline in the salmon
population alone would not create concurrent jurisdiction given the
comprehensive nature of the federal regulations.
The court discarded the appellate court's suggestion that the Mc-
Covey decision did not apply due to the fact that a majority of the
Klamath River salmon are hatched outside the reservation and that
as to these fish, state jurisdiction would apply. The court asserted
that the majority in McCovey was cognizant of the fact that many of
the Reservation's salmon spawned outside of the Reservation.
Finally, the court rejected the People's claim that newly discovered
historical documents revealed that the Yurok Indians enjoyed no fed-
erally protected fishing rights in the Klamath River; that is, Califor-
nia statehood in 1850 caused title of the Klamath River to pass from
the federal government to the state, thus making the 1891 creation of
the Reservation by the government invalid. The court answered this
by stating that such a claim flew in the face of every recent decision
involving Yurok Indians in the Reservation area.
Additionally, the People's contention failed substantively. The
court held that the federal government in 1891 did not have the
power to reserve fishing rights in the Klamath River through its
power "to regulate the navagable waters under the Commerce Clause
and to regulate government lands under Art. IV, § 3, of the Constitu-
tion." Mattz, 46 Cal. 3d at 372, 758 P.2d at 617, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 289.
The court thus reinforces the federal regulation of tribal reserva-
tions. Nevertheless, the decision should not be interpreted to mean
that a state can never act to protect scarce resources on Indian reser-
vations, as the majority implies that concurrent state jurisdiction
might be permissible where federal government or tribal authorities
fail to protect the resource through preventative measures.
JOHN AUGUSTINE SOPUCH III
VI. GOVERNMENT
In determining allowable off-duty activities for police
officers, section 1126 of the Government Code contains
examples of prohibited activity but is not an exhaustive
list: Long Beach Police Association v. City of Long Beach.
In Long Beach Police Officers Association v. City of Long Beach, 46
Cal. 3d 736, 759 P.2d 504, 250 Cal. Rptr. 869 (1988), the supreme court
held that section 1126 of the Government Code confers upon a local
agency the power to prevent a police officer from being collaterally
employed in any field that is incompatible with his or her official du-
ties. Moreover, the court viewed the four activities specifically enu-
merated in section 1126 as mere examples and not an exhaustive list
of prohibited conduct. See CAL. GOv'T CODE § 1126 (West 1980 &
Supp. 1989); see generally 63A AM. JUR. 2D Public Officers and Em-
ployees §§ 78-81 (1984); 52 CAL. JUR. 3D Public Officials § 174 (1979 &
Supp. 1988).
Police officer Russell Peterson, filed a request for collateral em-
ployment to work as a cvil process server which the Long Beach Po-
lice Department denied. Peterson filed a grievance with the
Department and claimed that their denial of a collateral employment
permit violated section 1126. He contended that the Department
could not deny an officer a collateral employment permit unless the
officer sought to engage in one of the four types of activities pro-
scribed by section 1126. See CAL. GOv'T CODE § 1126(b) (West 1980 &
Supp. 1989) ((1) using police time, equipment, badge, uniform or in-
fluence for personal gain; (2) receiving money for performing an act
required in officer's regular couse of duties; (3) performing an act
later subject to review by police department; (4) acts which involve
time demands affecting performance of official duties). Peterson
claimed that being a process server was not within the act's prohibi-
tions. The hearing officer ruled that the Department properly denied
the application. Peterson and the Long Beach Police Officers Associ-
ation (the Association) filed a petition for a writ of mandate, claiming
that section 1126 was intended to be an exhaustive list of prohibited
activities. At trial, the city conceded that employment as a civil pro-
cess server was not within any of the four enumerated categories set
forth in section 1126. Nevertheless, the city alleged that these sub-
sections were merely examples of proscribed activities and did not
constitute an exclusive list. The trial court denied the Association's
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petition, finding that the Department enjoyed discretion to determine
allowable off-duty activities. The court of appeal reversed.
To resolve this tension, the supreme court turned to the language
of section 1126. The court found section 1126(a) to be a sweeping pro-
scription against any activity incompatible with an officer's official
duties, but viewed section 1126(b) as conferring full discretion upon
the local appointing power to determine and regulate the activities it
deemed incompatible. Because the court found the meaning of sec-
tion 1126 less than axiomatic using this approach, it chose to ascertain
the correct statutory interpretation by analyzing the legislative his-
tory of section 1126.
The court found section 1126 to be modeled after section 19251 of
the Government Code (now section 19990 after recodification in 1981)
which addresses the collateral employment of state officers and em-
ployees. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 19990 (West Supp. 1989); see gener-
ally 52 CAL. JUR. 3D Public Officers § 147 (1979 & Supp. 1988). The
court noted that although sections 19251 and 1126 contained virtually
identical terminology and enumerated the same four prohibited activ-
ities, there existed a schism regarding the agency's authority to deter-
mine what constituted an incompatible activity. The language of
section 19251 stated that the appointing power shall give considera-
tion to the four enumerated activities when determining incompati-
bility. The court viewed this language as not limiting the state
agency's prohibition power concerning off-duty employment. The
court then pointed out that in 1986, section 19251 was recodified as
section 19990; at that time, the language pertaining to a state agency's
authority to define proscriptive activities was amended. See CAL.
GOV'T CODE § 19990 (West Supp. 1989); see generally 67 C.J.S. Of-
ficers and Public Employees § 32 (1978). The court found the new
language left no question that the legislature intended to illustrate,
not exhaust, the types of incompatible off-duty activities.
The court next traced the legislative history of section 1126. The
court's investigation revealed that the original version of section 1126
contained exactly the same language as section 19251. However,
when section 1126 emerged from the Senate Committee on Local
Government, the phrase dealing with the local agency's power to de-
fine incompatible activities had been altered. The amended version
of section 1126 required that a local agency must prohibit the activi-
ties mentioned in the statute, not merely consider them when deter-
mining the incompatibility of off-duty employment. This amendment
changed the incompatible activities listed in section 1126(b) from dis-
cretionary guidelines to minimum standards. However, the court
found that the true purpose of the amendment was to bolster the
statute by setting minimum standards for local agencies to follow,
while also leaving them free to delineate additional standards at their
discretion. After senate approval of the amendment, the assembly in
turn modified section 1126 to prevent the establishment of minimum
standards. When it was finally enacted, the language of section
1126(b) was essentially the same as that in section 19251, the section
it was modeled after in the first place. Therefore, the final modifica-
tion was found determinative of the legislature's intention to view
the enumerated activities in section 1126(b) as a guide and not to con-
strain a local agency's exercise of discretion.
In sum, although the court meticulously recounted the legislative
history of both section 19251 and section 1126, attempting to display
certain parallels, in the end it based its decision on the fundamental
principle of in par materia-"statutes upon the same matter or sub-
ject.., are to be construed together." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 711
(5th ed. 1979). By conferring a wide range of discretion upon a local
agency, the court not only deferred to the agency's expertise to de-
fine incompatible activities of off-duty employees, but it also light-
ened its own docket by legitimizing yet another forum for the
resolution of disputes.
JOHN AUGUSTINE SOPUCH III
VII. LEGISLATURE
The Legislature may instruct a state agency to carry out
a state statute that is not in conkflict with federal law:
Reese v. Kizer.
In Reese v. Kizer, 46 Cal. 3d 996, 760 P.2d 495, 251 Cal. Rptr. 299
(1988), the supreme court held that "the Legislature may direct an
administrative agency.., to implement a statute to the extent it does
not conflict with federal law." Id. at 997-98, 760 P.2d at 496, 251 Cal.
Rptr. at 299. Thus, consistent with article III, section 3.5(c) of the
California Constitution, authority was given to the Department of
Health Services (the Department) to implement a section of the Wel-
fare and Institutions Code to the extent that it did not conflict with
federal law. See generally CAL. CONST. art. III, § 3.5(c) ("An adminis-
trative agency . . . has no power: . . . (c) To declare a statute unen-
forceable, or to refuse to enforce a statute on the basis that federal
law or federal regulations prohibit the enforcement of such statute
.... "). See also 7 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Consti-
tutional Law § 57 (9th ed. 1987); 1 AM JUR. 2D Administrative Law
§ 123 (1962); 2 CAL. JUR. 3D Administrative Law § 73 (1979).
902
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In the present case, the Legislature had empowered the Depart-
ment to implement section 14005.16 of the Welfare and Institutions
Code to the extent it did not conflict with federal law. See generally
CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 14005.16 (West Supp. 1989) (a provision
of the Medi-Cal Act, providing that only community property is
"available" as income in determining eligibility for benefits to mar-
ried persons in nursing homes). The Department determined that
the statute conflicted with federal law and refused to implement it.
A class action was then instituted demanding the implementation of
section 14005.16.
The prevailing practice at the federal level was to consider all in-
come received in the institutionalized person's name when the issue
of eligibility was at stake. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (1985 & Supp. IV
1986). Under section 14005.16, only the institutionalized spouse's
share of the community property interest in the combined income of
the couple was to be considered in determining eligibility. The ra-
tionale behind the Department's refusal to implement section
14005.16 was the fear of losing federal funds. Medi-Cal is a joint fed-
eral-state program and in order to assure the availability of federal
funds, the state must operate within the guidelines imposed by fed-
eral statutes and regulations. As a safety valve, section 14005.16 con-
tained uncodified provisions giving the Department the authority to
avoid conflict with federal law. The provisions allowed the Depart-
ment to seek federal waivers if a conflict arose putting the federal
funding in jeopardy of being lost. See 1983 Cal. Stat. ch. 1031, § 2(c)
(section 2).
Concerned over the possible conflict between section 14005.16 and
42 U.S.C. § 1396, the director of the Department applied for a waiver
of federal regulations governing the treatment of institutionalized in-
dividuals' income for determining benefit eligibiity. The request for
waiver was denied. As a result, section 14005.16 was not
implemented.
In reversing the lower courts' decisions, the supreme court dis-
agreed with the court of appeal's conclusion that section 2 was void
ab initio because it instructed an agency to perform an act expressly
forbidden by the California Constitution. See CAL. CONST. art. III,
§ 3.5(c). The court pointed out that section 2 did not give an adminis-
trative agency power to independently determine that section
14005.16 conflicted with federal law, but rather directed the agency to
effectuate section 14005.16 to the fullest extent permissible under
federal law as determined by the appropriate federal agencies.
Therefore, the court refused to find section 2 and thus section
14005.16 adverse to any state constitutional provision.
The court then stated that section 3.5 of article III was enacted to
prevent agencies from frustrating the mandates of the legislature by
stripping them of any interpretive power. See CAL. CONST. art. III,
§ 3.5. The court did not perceive provisions like section 2 as re-
turning this authority to the agencies. Rather, allowing an agency to
limit the interpretation of a statute so that it is in accord with federal
regulations achieves precisely what the legislature intended.
The court concluded that without provisions like section 2 of
14005.16 allowing an agency to seek federal waivers, the Legislature
could not assure the statute's validity and concurrently guarantee the
full effectuation of the statute's underlying policy.
By reaching this decision, the court has done exactly what it said it
was not doing-returning to the agencies the power to interpret stat-
utes to decide whether to implement them, and the extent of their
implementation. The court attempts to distinguish between not al-
lowing an agency to independently interpret a statute and permitting
an agency to effectuate a statute's maximum permissible extent.
This distinction is esoteric; the court's decision bestows upon an
agency some form of discretionary power. This conferment is exactly
what section 3.5 of article III was designed to prevent.
JOHN AUGUSTINE SOPUCH III
VIII. TORTS
A. An unmarried cohabitant may not recover for negligent
infliction of emotional distress or loss of consortium,
even if the relationship was comparable to a marriage:
Eldon v. Sheldon.
In Eldon v. Sheldon, 46 Cal. 3d 267, 758 P.2d 582, 250 Cal. Rptr. 254
(1988), the supreme court held that a cohabitant witnessing the death
of the other cohabitant failed to state a cause of action for either neg-
ligent infliction of emotional distress or loss of consortium. The
court reached this decision despite the alleged stability and marriage-
like qualities of the cohabitants' relationship. In its analysis, the
court emphasized the state's interests in protecting the marital rela-
tionship and limiting the scope of the defendant's liability. Addition-
ally, the court noted the difficulty in determining the strength of the
cohabitants' relationship.
The plaintiff and the decedent, unmarried cohabitants, were in-
volved in a car accident with the defendant. The plaintiff, a passen-
ger in the decedent's car, witnessed the decedent's fatal injuries. The
plaintiff alleged that the defendant was negligent in causing the acci-
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dent. He sought recovery for his own injuries, for loss of consortium
and for negligent infliction of emotional distress from witnessessing
the decedent's death. The trial court sustained a demurrer to the lat-
ter two causes of action because the plaintiff and the decedent were
not married when the accident occurred.
The court addressed the negligent infliction of emotional distress
claim in light of its holding in Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d
912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968), that absent overriding policy considera-
tions, a bystander could recover for negligent infliction of emotional
distress from witnessing another's injuries. See id., at 740-41, 441
P.2d at 920-21, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80-81. See 38 AM. JUR. 2D Fright,
Shock and Mental Disturbance § 36 (1968 & Supp. 1988); 46 CAL. JUR.
3D Negligence § 76 (1978 & Supp. 1988); Annotation, Relationship Be-
tween Victim and Plaintiff- Witness as Affecting Right to Recover
Damages in Negligence for Shock or Mental Anguish at Witnessing
Victim's Injury or Death, 94 A.L.R. 3D 486 (1979); Annotation, Right
to Recover Damages in Negligence for Fear of Injury to Another, or
Shock or Mental Anguish at Witnessing Such Injury, 29 A.L.R. 3RD
1337 (1970). Recovery was contingent, however, upon proof that the
risk was foreseeable. Dillon, 68 Cal. 2d at 740-41, 441 P.2d at 920-21,
69 Cal. Rptr. at 80-81. The test for foreseeability is whether the
plaintiff: (1) was near the scene of the accident, (2) contemporane-
ously observed the accident, and (3) was closely related to the victim.
Id. Only the third element was at issue in Eldon v. Sheldon.
The plaintiff contended that the closely related requirement was
met as the relationship in this case was stable, meaningful, and com-
parable to that of a marriage. Because of the increase in unmarried
cohabitants, plaintiff contended that it was foreseeable that two un-
married cohabitants would occupy the same car. Cf Marvin v. Mar-
vin, 18 Cal. 3d 660, 665 n.1, 557 P.2d 106, 110, n.1, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815,
819 n.1 (1976); Meade, Consortium Rights of the Unmarried: Time for
Reappraisal, 15 FAM. L.Q. 223, 224 n.6 (1981).
The court rejected this argument, however, based on three overrid-
ing policy considerations. The court's first consideration was the
need to limit the scope of a negligent defendant's liability. Allowing
unmarried cohabitants to recover in cases such as this would unduly
burden society with an increase in lawsuits and frivolous claims. See
Borer v. American Airlines, Inc., 19 Cal. 3d 441, 448, 563 P.2d 858,
865, 138 Cal. Rptr. 302, 309 (1977); W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON
& D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS 932 (5th ed. 1984); Dia-
mond, Dillon v. Legg Revisited: Toward a Unified Theory of Compen-
sating Bystanders and Relatives for Intangible Injuries, 35 HASTINGS
L.J. 477, 483-87 (1984); Rabin, Tort Recovery for Negligently Inflicted
Economic Loss: A Reassessment, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1513, 1522-23
(1985).
The second policy consideration for denying recovery was to avoid
over-burdening the courts. Determining whether a relationship is
parallel to marriage would be time consuming, intrusive, and arbi-
trary. See Norman v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd., 34 Cal. 3d 1,
8-10, 663 P.2d 904, 908-10, 192 Cal. Rptr. 134, 138-40 (1983).
The court's final policy consideration was the strong state interest
in promoting the marital relationship. The court reasoned that ele-
vating unmarried cohabitants to the level of a marital relationship
would seriously impede that interest. See Neito v. City of Los Ange-
les, 138 Cal. App. 3d 464, 470-71, 188 Cal. Rptr. 31, 34 (1982). The
court added that this policy was based not on morality, but rather on
the need to distinguish between the rights and responsibilities of
married and unmarried persons in society. See Laws v. Griep, 332
N.W.2d 339, 341 (Iowa 1983).
The court also rejected the plaintiff's claim for loss of consortium.
Courts have allowed recovery under such a theory only when a mari-
tal relationship has existed. See, e.g., Ledger v. Tippitt, 164 Cal.
App. 3d 625, 633, 210 Cal. Rptr. 814, 817 (1985); Leiding v. Commer-
cial Diving Center, 143 Cal. App. 3d 72, 76, 191 Cal. Rptr. 559, 562
(1983). Since the plaintiff and the decedent never married, the court
held that the plaintiff failed to state a cause of action for loss of con-
sortium. The court added that the three policy considerations dis-
cussed for negligent infliction of emotional distress also apply to
claims for loss of consortium.
The court thus narrowed the scope of a defendant's liability regard-
ing claims for negligent infliction of emotional distress and loss of
consortium. An unmarried cohabitant who witnessed the death of
the other cohabitant may not recover under either of these theories.
Attempting to promote marriage, as well as protect society and the
judiciary from a flood of litigation, the court further refined a line in
the law of negligence which is rapidly growing brighter.
BRYAN HANCE
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B. The Unfair Practices Act does not provide third-party
claimants a private right of action against insurers
for unfair settlement practices. For actions pending
under the now overruled Royal Globe decision, a final
judgment determining liability is required prior to
any settlement: Moradi-Shalal v. Fireman's Fund
Insurance Companies.
In Moradi-Shalal v. Fireman's Fund Insurance Companies, 46 Cal.
3d 287, 758 P.2d 58, 250 Cal. Rptr. 116 (1988), the supreme court held
that the Unfair Practices Act (the Act) does not provide third-party
claimants a private right of action against insurers for unfair settle-
ment practices. See CAL. INS. CODE §§ 790-790.10 (West 1972 & Supp.
1989). The court thus overruled Royal Globe Insurance Co. v. Supe-
rior Court, 23 Cal. 3d 880, 592 P.2d 329, 153 Cal. Rptr. 842 (1979). See
California Practicum, The Overruling of Royal Globe: A "Royal Bo-
nanza"for Insurance Companies, But What Happens Now?, 16 PEP-
PERDINE L. REV. 763 (1989). The Moradi-Shalal decision, however,
only applies prospectively.
For those cases pending under the Royal Globe decision, the court
held that a final judgment determining the insured's liability is re-
quired before an action for statutory bad faith may be presented.
Moreover, this determination must be made prior to any settlement.
Litigants are thus no longer able to settle with each other before su-
ing the insurer for violations of section 790.03 of the Insurance Code.
The plaintiff and an insured of the defendant were involved in an
auto accident caused by the insured's negligence. The plaintiff twice
attempted to settle within a five-month period by writing to the de-
fendant. Finally, after the plaintiff filed suit against the insured, a
settlement was reached and the action was dismissed with prejudice.
The plaintiff then sued the defendant insurer under Royal Globe, al-
leging statutory bad faith in refusing to promptly and equitablly set-
tle the claim. The trial court held that the absence of a conclusive
judicial determination of the insured's liability in the first suit pre-
vented recovery in the subsequent action. The court of appeal re-
versed, holding that a settlement and subsequent dismissal with
prejudice was adequately conclusive. The issue before the court,
therefore, was whether a conclusive judicial determination of the in-
sured's liability is required before the insurer may be sued under the
Act.
To resolve this issue the court re-examined its opinion in Royal
Globe. The Royal Globe court held that a private right of action is
available under section 790.03 of the Insurance Code and that in-
sureds and third-party claimants injured by insureds could sue the in-
surer for unfair practices or "bad faith." Royal Globe, 23 Cal. 3d at
884-88, 592 P.2d at 332-34, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 845-47. In addition, this
suit could be based upon a single instance of insurer misconduct. Id.
at 891, 592 P.2d at 336, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 849. Finally, the court held
that a third-party claimant must await the conclusion of the action
against the insured before suing the insurer. Id. at 891-92, 592 P.2d at
336-37, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 849-50.
The Moradi-Shalal court studied the aftermath of the Royal Globe
decision. First the court noted that the majority of courts in other
states rejected Royal Globe opinion. See, e.g., Seeman v. Liberty Mut.
Ins. Co., 322 N.W.2d 35, 40-43 (Iowa 1982); Morris v. American Fam-
ily Mut. Ins. Co., 386 N.W.2d 233, 234-38 (Minn. 1986). Second, the
court admitted that the Royal Globe opinion received considerable
scholarly criticism. See, e.g., Allen, Insurance Bad Faith Law: The
Need for Legislative Intervention, 13 PAC. L.J. 833 (1982); Note, Ex-
tending the Liability of Insurance for Bad Faith Acts: Royal Globe
Insurance Company v. Superior Court, 7 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 777
(1980); Note, Rodriguez v. Fireman's Fund Insurance Companies,
Inc.: An Illustration of the Problems Inherent in the Royal Globe
Doctrine, 15 Sw. U.L. REV. 371 (1985).
Third, the court noted that the legislature attempted to overrule
the Royal Globe holding. The court held that such an attempt,
although not conclusive of the matter, was evidence of the legisla-
ture's misgivings concerning the Royal Globe decision. The court also
cited several adverse effects of the decision including: increases in lit-
igation, rising insurance and legal costs, frivolous bad faith claims
against insurers, and imprudent settlements. Based upon the forego-
ing consequences, the court overruled the Royal Globe.
The court warned that remedies nevertheless remain to punish in-
surer misconduct. For example, the insurance commissioner may is-
sue a cease and desist order against the insurer, impose a fine, or
suspend the insurer's license. See CAL. INS. CODE §§ 790.05-.09 (West
1972 & Supp. 1989). In addition, the courts may adjudicate insurer
misconduct under the common law torts of fraud, breach of the im-
plied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, breach of contract, or
infliction of emotional distress. Punitive damages may even be im-
posed against the insurer in some instances. See CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 3294 (West 1972 & Supp. 1989).
Stating that its decision applied prospectively, the court addressed
the necessary prerequisites for recovery in those cases pending under
Royal Globe. First, the court held that neither settling nor admitting
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liability is a satisfactory conclusion of the underlying action. A final
judicial determination that the insured was actually liable to the
third-party claimant is thus required. Moreover, this determination
may not be made after the settlement. See Heninger v. Foremost Ins.
Co., 175 Cal. App. 3d 830, 834, 221 Cal. Rptr. 303, 305-06 (1985); Na-
tional Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 128 Cal. App. 3d 711, 714, 180 Cal.
Rptr. 464, 466 (1982); Doser v. Middlesex Mut. Ins. Co., 101 Cal. App.
3d 883, 891, 162 Cal. Rptr. 115, 119-20 (1980).
The court mentioned several problems with permitting post-settle-
ment litigation. First, the claimant must still establish the insured's
liability in the subsequent action against the insurer. This allows the
claimant to sue both the insured and the insurer in the same lawsuit.
However, evidence of insurance or the existence of a previous settle-
ment would undoubtedly prejudice the jury's determination of the in-
sured's liability. See generally CAL. EVID. CODE § 1152 (West 1966 &
Supp. 1989) (evidence of settlement is inadmissible to prove liability
on the settled claim). Second, litigation is the very action a settling
party seeks to avoid. Third, permitting post-settlement litigation may
unjustly allow the claimant to retain the proceeds from both the set-
tlement and the subsequent suit, thereby resulting in a windfall to
the claimant. Finally, the insurer's duty to protect the insured's in-
terests may be adversly affected when it is concerned with its own
potential liability.
Thus, the court undertook some judicial housekeeping in attempt-
ing to rectify the post-Royal Globe problems. The Moradi-Shalal so-
lution is a victory for insurers as they no longer fear private statutory
causes of action, or post-settlement litigation under the Act. Never-
theless, strong administrative sanctions and various judicial remedies
in appropriate common law actions are certain to make the insurers
think twice about settlement actions.
BRYAN HANCE
C. An action by a personal injury claimant must not be
stayed against an insolvent insurance company if the
claimant elects to seek recovery wholly from the
insolvent's insurance coverage, and is able to
maintain an independent civil action: Webster v.
Superior Court.
In Webster v. Superior Court, 46 Cal. 3d 338, 758 P.2d 596, 250 Cal.
Rptr. 268 (1988), the supreme court held that under the Insurance
Code, a stay of personal injury actions is not mandated simply be-
cause an insurance company is entangled with insolvency proceed-
ings. See CAL. INS. CODE §§ 1011, 1016 (West 1972 & Supp. 1989); see
generally 43 AM. JUR. 2D Insurance §§ 88-107 (1982 & Supp. 1988);
Annotation, What Constitutes Insolvency of Insurance Company Jus-
tifying State Dissolution Proceedings and the Like, 17 A.L.R. 4TH 1
(1982); but see 39 CAL. JUR. 3D Insurance Companies §§ 153, 155, 159
(1977 & Supp. 1988). The court also held that a personal injury
claimant must make a binding election to seek recovery from either
the insolvent's assets or from the insolvent's insurance coverage. If
the claimant seeks recovery wholly from the latter, the court must
allow him the maintainance of an independent civil action. If the
claimant refuses to make an election or seeks even partial recovery
from the insolvent's assets, his personal injury action may be stayed,
leaving settlement to the discretion of an insurance commissioner ap-
pointed as conservator of the insolvent. See CAL. INS. CODE § 1020
(West 1972 & Supp. 1989); see generally 39 CAL. JUR. 3D Insurance
Companies § 153 (1977 & Supp. 1988).
In January 1982, Webster, an employee of Mission Insurance Com-
pany, (Mission), which shared offices with Enterprise Insurance
Company (Enterprise), lost the use of his only leg after the estranged
husband of an Enterprise employee entered the offices with a shot-
gun and randomly shot Webster. Enterprise carried primary liability
coverage of $500,000 from Great American Insurance Company
(Great American). In addition, Enterprise had excess coverage from
First State Insurance Company. These two insurance companies de-
fended Enterprise.
During the Webster proceeding, the Insurance Commissioner of
California (Commissioner) received a court order placing Enterprise
under the Commissioner's conservatorship due to insolvency. The or-
der enjoined all actions against Enterprise or the Commissioner.
Webster filed a motion relief from the stay, claiming that any relief
awarded would come from Enterprise's insurance coverage and not
its assets. The Commissioner and Enterprise argued that if the in-
junction were lifted, the Commissioner's orderly administration of
Enterprise would be thwarted, and Webster would gain an unfair ad-
vantage over other claimants.
The lower courts denied Webster's motion but the supreme court
reversed and lifted the stay. The supreme court justified this deci-
sion on several grounds. First, the court determined that the lan-
guage of section 1020 of the Insurance Code did not require a
permanent stay of Webster's action. See CAL. INS. CODE § 1020 (West
1972 & Supp. 1989). The court disagreed with Enterprise's literal in-
terpretation of the phrase, "the court shall issue such other injunc-
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tions or orders as may be deemed necessary to prevent any or all of
the following occurrences [including] . . .the institution or prosecu-
tion of any actions or proceedings." See CAL. INS. CODE § 1020 (West
1972 & Supp. 1989) (emphasis added). The court pointed out that the
adoption of such a rigid definition of this section would spawn direct
conflicts with other provisions of the Insurance Code as well as other
areas of California law. See CAL. INS. CODE § 11580 (West 1972 &
Supp. 1988); 39 CAL. JUR. 3D Insurance Companies §§ 338, 343, 425-
428 (1977 & Supp. 1988); see also CAL. LAB. CODE § 5300 (West 1971 &
Supp. 1989); 65 CAL. JUR. 3D Work Injury Compensation § 227 (1981
& Supp. 1989).
The court further held that to remove a court's discretion in de-
termining the appropriateness of an injunction would conflict with
the basic legal principle conferring discretion on the courts when eq-
uitable remedies are at issue. The court also stated that forcing a
court to require a stay in all cases could prevent the very result that
the Insurance Code was designed to achieve-orderly administration
of the insolvent.
The court then focused its attention on whether a claimant, in or-
der to avoid a stay of his action, must make a binding election to seek
recovery solely from the insolvent's insurance coverage. The court
stated that the main purpose of section 1020 of the Insurance Code
was to protect the assets of an insolvent insurer for orderly distribu-
tion. The court noted that this purpose is met by requiring a claim-
ant to make a binding election either to seek recovery solely from
the insolvent's insurance coverage or proceed against the insolvent's
assets.
By reaching this decision, the court invaded a realm traditionally
occupied by the Commissioner and wrested substantial power from
this office-the power to resolve legal disputes involving an insolvent
insurance company's insurance coverage. By reducing the Commis-
sioner's authority, the supreme court has streamlined the administra-
tion of an insolvent insurance company's assets. The court's decision
will expedite the recovery process for personal injury claimants who
are willing to seek insurance claims to satisfy their judgments and
will increase their odds that these judgement awards will better re-
flect the actual damages due.
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